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I
The world has changed significantly since 
the disintegration of USSA. After destroying 
the bipolar system of equilibrium, some forces, 
which had had some importance in the past, but 
still remained on the sidelines, became global 
geopolitical players. Some of them tend to occupy 
a leading position, and simultaneously treating a 
Russia as a serious competitor, try to push her out 
of the world politics.
In such difficult conditions is it particularly 
important to study the tactics and the use of “smart 
power”, which alternates between two forms of 
political action (influence of the reaction) – “soft” 
and “hard power” depending on the situation. 
Unfortunately, the powerful potential of this 
approach in our country remains highly unclaimed. 
Meanwhile, the tactic of “smart power” allows 
us to respond flexibly to the changing realities 
of foreign policy and protect the interests of 
Russia, while avoiding unnecessary conflict and 
consolidating forces from neighboring countries, 
strengthening relations with traditional allies, 
and acquiring new ones.
The vectors of Russian foreign policy have 
been identified by Vladimir V. Putin in his project 
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of creating a new form of integration with former 
Soviet republics – the Eurasian Union. The essence 
of the latter he defined as “a model of powerful 
supranational union, which is able to become one 
of the poles of the modern world and to play the 
role of an effective “binding” between Europe 
and a dynamic Asia-Pacific region.”1 An effective 
application of “smart power” may contribute to 
the implementation of these priorities, and ensure 
the security of the country.
The issue of safety has not been raised by 
chance. There are forces that find unprofitable 
to consolidate Russia’s foreign policy positions 
and strengthen its economic impact. To achieve 
their ambitious plans, these entities use both 
legal and “shadow” methods. International 
terrorism is increasingly being used as such a 
method.
It’s no secret that Islamic fundamentalism 
is currently the most dynamic and fast-growing 
figure in international politics. Its adherents 
express their will for world domination more 
often and more loudly. However, many of them 
do not see anything wrong in building a global 
caliphate with extremist methods.
These methods and their implications are 
well known in our country, as well as the fact 
that the process of changing of the Caucasus 
region into the cradle of international terrorism 
is directly linked to the fact that religious centers 
in Central Asia have become under control of 
foreign radical Islamists.2
Political regimes in Kazakhstan and Central 
Asian states are secular in nature. However, a 
major part of the population of these countries 
professes Islam to some extent. Many adherents 
of this religion live in Russia. In this regard, 
holding the interests of our state, it is important 
to avoid an escalation of tensions in relations with 
the Islamic world. Religious conflicts can hinder 
integration and create the most unpredictable 
consequences.
II
Speaking about the current state of global 
terrorism, it should be noted that the qualitative 
composition of the organizations, practitioners 
of extremism, is now significantly different from 
the picture, which can be seen 30-40 years ago. 
Previously, the leaders of radical groups have paid 
attention only to the devotion to the idea, their 
belief in the validity of the use of violence and 
their willingness to die while training of rank-
and-file members (the perpetrators of terrorist 
acts). Today, these qualities are necessary but 
not sufficient for successful implementation of 
the terrorists to achieve their goals. This trend 
is confirmed by the studies conducted by the 
experts in this field.
In 1972, a psychologist B.J. Berkowitz 
singled out and described the psychological types 
of people, who constitute the greatest threat to 
use weapons of mass destruction. He included 
paranoid, paranoid schizophrenic and borderline 
mentally retarded and schizophrenic types in the 
“risk group”. But as for the most likely “candidates 
for the terrorists”, the writer considered to be 
sociopaths.3
Currently, not all the colleagues of B.J. 
Berkowitz share this point of view. Scientists 
recognize that some schizophrenics and sociopaths 
dream of extermination of the population. But 
the actions of this category of citizens can hardly 
achieve the required result. The reason is simple: a 
large-scale dissemination of chemical, biological, 
or radiological agents requires considerable 
and well-coordinated efforts of an entire group 
of people. However, it is often difficult for 
schizophrenics to communicate in any kind of 
groups and sociopaths are pathologically unable 
to cooperate, even within their peer groups.
As pointed out by E. O’Ballens, a 
“successful” terrorist should perform an initiation 
rite accepted in the group and prove his qualities 
such as courage, absolute loyalty to the leader of 
– 224 –
Pavel V. Klachkov. “Soft Power” and “Smart Power” in the Process of Counter-Terrorist Operation
the movement and the absolute lack of pity and 
compassion for the victims of terrorism (including 
innocent people, women and children). But 
beyond this, one requires the intelligence, high 
enough for collecting and analyzing the relevant 
information, planning and implementation of 
complex transactions, and conspiracy. A good 
education is also of great importance (university 
degree is almost obligatory.) The latter implies in 
particular proficiency in foreign languages.4
To create or acquire, to get ready for the 
application and set into action some complex 
mechanisms, which include not only weapons 
of mass destruction, but also many examples of 
modern weapons, a terrorist should require special 
knowledge and skills. The latter are only typical 
for people who have professional education. It 
is a well-known fact for leaders of the terrorist 
community and the majority of them are highly 
educated. Since1990 specialists in different 
fields of science and technology have started 
playing a leading role among the organizers and 
perpetrators of terrorist operations. Education 
and professionalism clearly distinguish them 
from terrorist commandos of 1960-70ss., who 
had only simple skills acquired in conventional 
training camps. Osama bin Laden paid particular 
attention to recruiting his terrorist network 
by highly qualified specialists in the field of 
medicine, chemistry, physics, programming, 
telecommunications, etc.5
III
As a rule, terrorists have become socially 
excluded people. Those who have a low level 
of education (such as young people from the 
Algerian ghettos or the Gaza Strip) can join a 
terrorist group to make their seemingly boring 
existence diverse and varied and to have fun, 
even in such an extraordinary way. Some of 
them may be primarily motivated by a desire to 
put into practice some specific skills, such as an 
ability to create self-made explosive devices. As 
a rule, better-educated young people are on this 
path, guided, by political or religious views.
A system of education may be some kind 
of nutrient medium for terrorism. For example, 
in religious schools in Pakistan “the basics, 
which is taught to boys is the knowledge of 
the Koran by heart in Arabic and the ability to 
recite rhythmically its 144 chapters (the boys are 
admitted to madrasahs at the age of 6). It takes 
ten years. Except for the Koran, a graduate of 
madrasah knows a little at 16: the earth is flat, 
Islam is the only true religion, and America, India 
and Israel are his deadly enemies. (According 
only to official figures, there are about 13,500 
such kind of educational institutions in Pakistan, 
but some unofficial sources claim the existence 
of nearly 40 thousands of madrasahs)”. 6Such a 
pattern is typical for people not only this state, 
but some other countries as well, in particular, 
neighboring Afghanistan, where such education 
is often the only affordable for its citizens.
Young people, who become terrorists in 
Western countries, seek for some spiritual needs, 
being unable to find the answer in their close 
society. It is noteworthy that many of them have 
an intellectual level that is above the average 
one. It’s typical for the ‘western’ terrorists to 
have disillusionment with traditional social and 
religious institutions. For example, J. Becker 
characterized the West German left-wing radical 
terrorist organization RAF as “children without 
fathers.” They despised his parents and rebelled 
against them, unwilling to forgive them the shame 
of Nazism and the defeat of Germany.7
Many future members of terrorist groups 
begin as sympathizers. Newcomers are often 
drawn from the various “promotion organizations” 
such as community support for prisoners and 
student activist groups. A kind of recruiting 
chain is made: an attentive listener – an interested 
interlocutor – a sympathizing well-wisher – a 
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passive supporter. It is much easier to persuade 
the latter one to actually commit extremist and 
terrorist activities rather than people “from 
outside”, who are not prepared psychologically 
and ideologically.
The circumstances, under which people 
are already on the verge of social exclusion, 
join a terrorist group, may vary. Sometimes a 
person becomes a terrorist due to the gradual 
“inculcation” in the extremist environment. A 
family member or close friend who has ties to 
terrorists often helps him doing it. Sometimes 
this process is accelerated by the violent conflicts 
with the police or other security forces.
IV
Another feature of modern terrorism is an 
active involvement of new members. A full range 
of available media, communications and advocacy 
is used. Having mastered all the subtleties of 
influence on people’s consciousness and the 
influence of “public relations” technology on the 
population in all its minutest details, terrorists 
perfectly alternated their actions based on the 
psychological pressure and intimidation, trying 
to portray themselves and their activities in the 
most favorable light for potential supporters. Let 
us consider a number of successful PR-projects 
carried out by terrorists and their supporters in 
recent years.
Mastering the Internet, supporters of 
terrorism have created a large number of sites 
preaching radical ideas. One of the typical 
examples of these resources is the online edition 
of “Inspire”, whose target audience consists 
of young English-speaking Muslims living in 
Europe and America. The creator of the magazine 
is Samir Khan, born in Saudi Arabia, but grew up 
in the U.S. so he has U.S. citizenship. Even when 
he was a teenager, he became active in several 
Islamic groups. Samir Khan holds a situation 
under control and has extensive experience in 
the Internet. He is not difficult to find common 
language with the target audience. Taking into 
account the psychological characteristics of 
20-25-year-olds who prefer vigorous actions to 
philosophical reflection, the publication focuses 
its attention not on theology but on calls for 
action. In addition to anti-American slogans, 
the site includes practical instructions for the 
creating and using of self-made explosive devices. 
Strengthening the Muslims in the pursuit of jihad, 
inspiring them to radical ideas and inspiring 
them to fight with Western society, “Inspire” 
has become an effective part of a complex and 
extensive campaign of al-Qaeda.8
Another example of successful application 
of “soft power” with Islamic methods may result 
from the field of fashion. Several years ago it 
became fashionable for some members of youth 
subcultures to wear an Arab scarf called keffiyeh, 
colloquially referred to as “arafatka” (on behalf 
of PLO leader Yasser Arafat),which became a 
symbol of Palestinian extremists even in the 
1970s. This trend was reflected in the collections 
of famous fashion designers. Traditional Afghan 
headwear “pakul” has become popular in a similar 
way. It is significant that this occurred in a while 
after the terrorists’ acts that shocked the world in 
September 11, 2001. Having played on the desire 
of the youth to stand out of the crowd, the Islamist 
propagandists offered their own version of “a slap 
in the face to the public taste.”9
Speaking about the work of radical groups 
on the “image appeal” of their members, it should 
be mentioned an example of the Chechen fighters 
who fought on their side of the Arab mercenaries. 
Beards, camouflage and a Kalashnikov rifle 
quite corresponded to the image of Cuban 
revolutionaries, including Che Guevara, whose 
image is a symbol of resistance to global capitalism 
for supporters of the left-wing political theories. 
Western media have played an important role in 
creating a romantic aureole surrounding the North 
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Caucasian separatists, and in depicting them as 
fighters for independence forced to combat for 
the freedom of their motherland. 10
However, there are cases of terrorist 
propaganda of “hard power”. As examples of 
“hard power” may be given a “cartoon scandal” 
in 2005-2006, triggered by the publication of 
satirical portraits of Muhammad in a Danish 
newspaper “Jyllands-Posten”, threats to the 
creators of the animated series “South Park”, 
which took liberties of Muslims, and a murder 
of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 for 
releasing his short film about Muslim women, 
“Submission”.11
Considering only a few elements of an 
expanded and many-sided system of extremist 
propaganda, we should admit that it is high 
time to develop an effective program for state 
countermeasures. That is why we should take 
into account both the qualitative changes in the 
terrorist community, as well as factors leading 
enlisting of new “recruits”.
V
The last years have revealed that despite 
involving a large number of forces and arms, 
the effectiveness of military counter-terrorist 
operations is often lower than expected. They 
cost a lot (in terms of both material costs and 
human costs) and do not always bring the desired 
results. Such events are important in most cases 
when terrorists are made to apply force, and it is 
impossible to avoid open conflict.
Preventive measures of using force are 
rarely justified for several reasons. Firstly, they 
cause a negative reaction from citizens who are 
not involved in terrorist activities, but came under 
suspicion or have suffered any damages as a 
result of special operations. Secondly, the “clean-
up operations” with using weapons, cannot but 
infringe the interests of civilians in some form or 
other due to their scale and violent nature. Thirdly, 
and shown by lots of good examples ,those against 
whom they are directed such operations have 
accumulated extensive experience in combat, and 
also have learned how to use them for propaganda 
purposes. Terrorists treat the killed accomplices 
as saints who fought for the idea, and detainees 
and convicts as prisoners of conscience.
Statistics results that most terrorist groups 
do not stop their activities when faced with a 
military confrontation. Moreover, some of them 
manage to reach their goals. Examples include the 
“Irgun Zevai Leumi” (from Herbrew: “National 
Military Organization in the Land of Israel”) in 
Israel, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, 
or EOKA (from Greek -National Organisation 
of Cypriot Fighters) in Cyprus and the Front 
de Libération Nationale, or FLN (“National 
Liberation Front”) in Algeria12. Bruce Hoffman, 
far from a radical academic, grudgingly admits 
that “Although governments throughout history 
and all over the world always claim that terrorism 
is ineffective as an instrument of political change, 
the examples of Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria . . 
.provide convincing evidence to the contrary”. 
According to Hoffman, B.: “While governments 
throughout history and around the world have 
always argued that terrorism is ineffective as an 
instrument of political change, the example of 
Israel, Cyprus and Algeria, we find convincing 
evidence to the contrary.”13
There are cases when a terrorist group 
goes to the non-violent tactics and is included 
in the peaceful political process. Sometimes 
law enforcement authorities can arrest or 
physically destroy its leaders. In case when 
the extremists have some constructive aims, a 
peaceful resolution of conflict may be possible. 
And only when there is no basis for dialogue and 
opportunities for the incorporation of members 
of radical organizations in civilian life, the most 
effective method of protection is the elimination 
of such groups.
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Taking into account that even successful 
law enforcement counter-terror operations often 
lead to undesirable side effects, it is important 
to turn the weapons against the ideologists of 
terrorism. It’s necessary to play on the field, 
where they have been total victors, having 
met no decent resistance yet. It is important to 
study the experience of combat, gained by law 
enforcement agencies around the world, and 
the experience of the terrorists themselves, as 
reflected in their policy statements, internal 
documents, confessions, memories, etc. A 
comprehensive analysis of this rich material 
will allow drawing serious lessons from it and 
developing new “soft”, but efficient methods 
of combating extremism and terrorism. It has 
already been mentioned above about the high 
cost, lack of efficiency and undesirable side 
effects of military operations. One should also 
take into account the gospel truth, valid for 
all times and countries: it’s much easier and 
effective to prevent committing an atrocity and 
forestall bloodshed, counteracting the criminals 
still at the stage of conception and planning of 
their illegal actions.
Such an approach implies a fundamental 
change in the ending a “war” against terrorism 
and a transition to a new stage, the essence of 
which is reflected by the term “counter terrorism”, 
which is used by most governments, faced with 
the problem of terrorism. The shift of military 
terminology into almost a “civil” one has a great 
symbolic significance. Even Donald Rumsfeld, 
a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, had serious 
reasons to worry about using the term “war on 
terror” because he believed that the word “war” 
led people to emphasize the importance of the 
military component of this multidimensional 
confrontation. 14In addition, extremists often 
use the expression “war on terror” in their 
propaganda, claiming that the West led by the 
United States is waging war against the entire 
Islamic world, which means that the reaction of 
Muslims must be jihad.
VI
A concept of “smart power” suggests a more 
active use of techniques in counter-terrorism, 
used in “public relations” (PR). If we consider 
the latter as “a system of information-analytical 
and procedural and technological activities 
aimed at harmonizing the relationships within 
a project, as well as between the members of 
the project and its external environment for 
the successful implementation of this project,” 
15and if by “harmonizing relationships” we 
understand the consistency of measures 
taken , if we imply “certain project” as 
counter-terrorism activities, and “external 
environment” as the country’s population, so 
the methods used by experts in this field, can 
be successfully used to perform various tasks 
in antiterrorist operations.
International political experience, including 
an experience in combating terrorism, contains 
many examples of effective use of methods of 
interaction with the public. For example, FBI 
decided to ask for help from the leaders of Islamic 
organizations to change the negative attitude 
towards the leadership of the Bureau as the majority 
of American Muslim community considers FBI 
a powerful and omniscient government agency 
designed to “punish the Muslims”. Nevertheless, 
the heads of the FBI have made this approach an 
important part of its counterterrorism strategy 
in spite of the fact that most American Muslims 
are not in the U.S. religious organizations, or are 
part of small communities in the mosques, and 
almost all the associations, with rare exceptions, 
are related with the “Muslim Brotherhood”, 
at least ideologically. Such solutions have 
shown their effectiveness. FBI director Robert 
Mueller has stated in congressional testimony 
“We now have partners in the Arab-American 
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and Muslim communities. Some have become 
publicly declared allies in our efforts to condemn 
terrorism. They have become our bridge to many 
who viewed the FBI with either contempt, or 
worse, fear”16
Another positive example is a multi-faceted, 
multi-year strategy of combating extremism aimed 
at discrediting terrorist ideology, as a result of it 
was created The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP). It comprises Mauritania, 
Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia and Burkina Faso. The main 
objectives of the organization are strengthening 
regional counterterrorism capabilities and 
enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation 
among the region’s security forces. The emphasis 
of TSCTP is not only holding military special 
operations but it’s on preserving the traditional 
tolerance and moderation displayed in most 
African Muslim communities and countering 
the development of extremism, particularly in 
youth and rural populations, so it’s against all 
the attempts to “Al Qaeda” and other similar 
organizations to extend the radical ideology 
among traditionally moderate Muslim populations 
of the region.17
Researches in the field of sociology and 
mass psychology provide a scientific basis for 
competent counter extremism and terrorism. 
In the late 1960s, F. Emery, an Australian 
psychologist, studied a specific social behavior 
of young people at rock festivals (particularly at 
the famous festival at Woodstock). As a result of 
long observation the researcher concluded that 
this activity resembles bees swarming. Scientists 
have even introduced a special term, “adolescence 
swarming” and found out the connection between 
this phenomenon and the so-called “hysterical 
rebellion.” Moreover, he came to conclusion that 
such a “swarm” can be effectively managed for 
political purposes, including the organization of 
coups.18
Several decades later, the fruits of F. 
Emery’s research, supplemented with the 
advances in communications, have been used by 
the organizers of so-called “color revolutions.” 
Using a mobile phone and sending messages, 
experienced facilitators guided “revolutionary” 
masses, leading them to the right direction, 
instantly correcting the behavior of different 
groups and thus ensuring coherence. 19 Anti-
globalists use modern methods of early warning 
for carrying out their actions. These technologies 
form the basis of a recent practice of “flash mobs” 
which arise spontaneously and, as a rule, are 
senseless mass performances. Time, place, and 
scenario are sent to their members through the 
Internet or the mobile phone.
VII
Of all the variety of PR-technologies that 
can enhance the effectiveness of anti-terrorist 
measures, there are several that can be the most 
effective.
1. Conducting a campaign to discredit a 
terrorist organization.
Participation in a terrorist group gives its 
members a sense of being chosen; it is associated 
with a peculiar prestige that attracts newcomers. 
Conducting public campaigns, discrediting such 
communities, can reduce the attractiveness 
of their membership in the eyes of potential 
candidates, thus reducing the quantity and the 
quality of the radical organizations. For example, 
the demonstration of differences in financial 
position between its leaders and rank-and-file 
members may sober down people who want to 
join the extremist group. 
2. Information security.
Ignoring a terrorist group with the media, 
non-proliferation of extremist statements 
reduces to zero all the efforts of radicals to 
influence a political situation. Their activities 
do not achieve the desired effect without public 
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coverage and, by and large, does not make sense. 
However, the steps in this direction should be 
very careful and thoughtful, not to provoke 
further terrorist attacks. In addition, it should 
be noted that the current level of growth in 
communication makes almost any information 
message available to numerous people without 
applying for “traditional” media.
3. Creating “negative image” of terrorists in 
the information space.
It is about spreading information through 
the media, and through informal channels of 
communication, making terrorists live in a 
constant state of fear and paranoia, constantly 
experiencing severe psychological pressure.
4. An active involvement of the police into 
anti-terrorist campaigns.
Police officers (in the first place, district 
inspectors) can sometimes get more information 
about the actions of terrorist groups, operating in 
the territory under their control, its movements, 
plans, and upcoming operations than the 
representatives of military intelligence. In 
addition, they are much more aware of the 
operational situation in the area and may have 
some valuable information.
5. The formation of an integrated model of 
a criminal act of terrorism (bombing, hostage 
taking, etc.), through its comprehensive analysis.
“Mental maps” (or mind maps), widely used in 
business development strategies for the formation 
of companies, can be taken for this purpose as 
well. This technique will help to understand the 
extremists better, to reveal their true motives and 
intentions. On this basis, it is possible to predict 
future developments and choose the best methods 
of resistance.
6. Attracting general population to 
cooperation.
A key factor in the success of the anti-
terrorist operation is to support the population. 
We should agree that “Those, who can seize the 
initiative in dealing with civilians, get a chance 
of dominating in the situation, and eventually of 
winning a victory. The leading role of this factor 
clearly shows that it’s impossible to deal effectively 
with the rebels while using traditional methods, 
primarily the use of conventional weapons and 
tactics of the general purpose forces. Therefore, 
<...> the main role should be led to nonviolent 
control and subjugation of civilians in order to 
lose the strength of the rebel forces. In this regard 
information and psychological warfare are the 
main elements there. “20
7. Involving members of public authority.
We can derive a great benefit from 
participation of people, whose opinion has great 
weight in society, in counter-terrorism. We are 
talking about well-known figures of culture, 
science and art, respected people, the elders, etc. 
Their public speech and appeals, as well as their 
participation in informal meetings can help to 
reduce social tension and conflict that may cause 
terrorism and extremism.
VIII
In summary, we can draw some conclusions. 
A rapidly changing political reality requires a 
more flexible decision-making, high competence 
in various fields and an ability to keep an eye on the 
many factors that may influence the development 
of the situation. Only with these qualities, you 
can count on successful participation in a global 
geopolitical game.
Eliminating the threat of terrorism is 
one of the biggest challenges facing the world 
today. The most dangerous form of terrorism is 
international terrorism, which in fact represents 
a global extremist underground, having a 
complex and branched structure, as well as 
a kind of terrorism, trying to use weapons of 
mass destruction in achieving their goals. A 
wide range of methods, successfully applied 
in areas such as PR, business, sociology and 
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psychology, should be used to counteract the 
terrorists.
Attention should be also drawn to the latest 
developments and adopting the techniques used in 
various fields of human activity. New approaches, 
extensively using “soft” but effective action, 
allow us to improve the effectiveness of military 
operations, and also can be used as separate forms 
of counter-terrorism. In many cases, methods of 
“soft power” are much more productive than their 
hard options, the response to which can cause a 
wave of terrorist activity.
It is important to emphasize that the set 
tasks are doomed to failure without the close 
cooperation of the armed forces and intelligence 
agencies with representatives of different sectors 
of civil society. In contrast, coordinated and 
cooperative action of these parties can create real 
barriers to the spread of terrorism. A detailed 
program of action, providing a possibility of 
combat and special operations, and various 
methods of “non-violent” resistance, should be 
developed and adopted to perform for the most 
effective counter-terrorism.
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Статья посвящена трансформации террористических организаций в современных условиях и 
новым методам противодействия терроризму, успешно апробированным в таких сферах, как 
PR, бизнес, социология и психология. Демонстрируются профессионализация террористических 
сообществ, освоение ими новых полей действия – таких, как сфера масс-медиа, Интернет и 
даже стили одежды. В этой связи автор предлагает существенно расширить формы и методы 
контртеррористической деятельности. Речь идет, прежде всего, о технологии “smart power”, 
чередующей, в зависимости от ситуации, “мягкую” и “жёсткую” силу. Эти более гибкие, 
но при этом эффективные подходы могут как повышать эффективность традиционных 
контртеррористических операций, так и применяться самостоятельно. В завершении 
статьи приводится ряд конкретных рекомендаций. В их числе более активное привлечение 
общественности, составление “ментальных карт” террористов, диффамационные кампании 
против подрывных организаций и т.д.
Ключевые слова: терроризм, экстремизм, международная безопасность, международный 
терроризм, “smart power”, “soft power”, государственная политика, экстремизм.
